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A. INTRODUCTION
Viewed across all international jurisdictions, modern insider trading laws have
taken three principal forms.1 The first and oldest is the American approach, which
involves a very general anti-fraud provision, given content by adjudication in
insider trading cases.2 The second generation of insider trading laws involved
more detailed statutory provisions which define the categories of persons who may
be insiders and whose use of private information for trading purposes will be pro-
hibited. These categories are usually a category of “primary” insiders, primarily
fiduciaries and other executives, and “secondary” insiders who acquire informa-
tion via primary insiders. This is perhaps the most common form of insider trad-
ing law observed in the world today. The English laws, recently redrafted, are a
leading example.3 The third generation was pioneered in Australian law,4 and has
been (or is to be) copied in a few other jurisdictions.5 It also relies on detailed statu-
tory provisions, but eschews any attempt to define a category of proscribed traders.
In place of “person connections”, it substitutes “information connections” which
aim to catch a wider subset of informed trading.6
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1 The common law proscribed trading of securities on private information in a limited category of sit-
uations. It is arguable that the categories in the United States are somewhat more expansive in the
United States: cf. Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, Strong v Repide, 213 US 419 (1909). For analysis,
see Michael J Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law (Aldershot, Ashgate,
2001) 157–161.
2 The principal source of the prohibition on insider trading is the general antifraud provision, rule
10b-5 (17 CFR s 240.10b-5 (2000)), enacted in pursuance of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
USC s 78 [hereinafter the 1934 Act]. Various federal legislation increases the sanction associated with
breach of Rule 10b-5, including the mail and wire fraud statutes, as well as the specific punitive pro-
visions in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, 15 USC s 78u(d)(2), and the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 1988 Pub L. No. 100–704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). American law
on insider trading does, however, involve other more specific prohibitions of trading on private infor-
mation. These include the prohibition on short-swing profits (those where sale occurs within six
months of purchase) by insiders under s 16(b) of the 1934 Act; a duty to disclose or abstain imposed
on a person who receives material nonpublic information about a tender offer that originates with
either the offeror or the target under Rule 14e-3 under the 1934 Act; and a prohibition on short-
selling by insiders under section 16(c) of the 1934 Act. 
3 Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss 52–64; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Other examples of insider
trading laws to predicate insider trading liability on person connections include the European Union
approach, embodied in Council Directive 89/592, Co-ordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing; the South
African approach, in the Insider Trading Act 1998; the New Zealand approach in the Securities
Amendment Act 1988.
4 The Australian insider trading provisions were introduced to the then-extant Corporations Act 2001 by
the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth Aust.). After the constitutional scheme underlying
the Corporations Act 2001 suffered substantial damage, in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198
CLR 511 and R v Hughes (2000) 74 ALJR 802, these provisions were re-enacted in the same form in
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), after the states referred constitutional power to the federal govern-
ment to enact such a law. Change to the insider trading provisions has been foreshadowed by the
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Insider Trading, Discussion Paper (2001).
5 Malaysia has adopted similar legislation: Securities Industry Act 1983. The Monetary Authority of
Singapore is considering adopting analogous legislation: see the Draft Securities and Futures Act 2001. 
6 Corporations Act 2001 ss 1002–1002U.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. The American approach
has the advantage of considerable flexibility, and can avoid the inherent problem
with underinclusion and overinclusion that arises when applying black-letter rules
to so complex a subject as insider trading.7 Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear that
the dominant American approach—the misappropriation theory—has avoided
inclusion problems, since, for example, a non-fiduciary who makes a point of steal-
ing information from a corporation is arguably outside the remit of the theory.8
Moreover, its underlying rationale has varied confusingly over time, in the face of
dogged attempts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to reinstate an
underlying theory—equal access to information—rejected by the Supreme Court
in the early 1980s.9
The “person connection” approach allows the legislature to commit to a policy,
with intuitive appeal from an allocative efficiency perspective, that separates insider
trading from the larger category of informed trading. Informed trading is crucial to
market efficiency and the accurate and timely reflection of information in stock
prices.10 The problem with such an approach, however, is that drawing the line ex
ante to achieve that balance can be very difficult. This is the problem of underin-
clusion and overinclusion. Likewise, such proscriptions may encourage proscribed
traders to attempt to act strategically to avoid the provision by trading through
intermediaries, tipping, and so on (which persons may not be capable of being sanc-
tioned as “secondary insiders”). Moreover, as Ayres and Choi have recently
argued, in a challenge to conventional wisdom, it may be that trading by insiders is
much less problematic in efficiency terms than trading by outsiders.11 To sum-
marise briefly their argument, a corporation is in a reasonable position to permit or
prohibit insider trading by its executives and fiduciaries, because it internalises the
effect of both the benefits and costs from insider trading. By contrast, outsiders do
not bear significant components of both the cost and the benefits of their trades,
besides the cost of producing information and the private benefit from the trade.
They therefore favour a contractarian approach that allows the firm to decide by
whom, and to what extent, “outsider trading” in its securities is permitted.
The “information connection” approach suffers considerably from overinclu-
sion. It fails to register the informed trading/insider trading distinction. In order
to avoid those problems, it relies on an appropriate set of defences and exclusions
October  Journal of Corporate Law Studies 423
7 See eg R Phillips and R Zutz, “The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair”
(1984) 13 Hofstra Law Review 65; J Cox, “Choices: Paving the Road Toward a ‘Definition’ of Insider
Trading” (1988) 39 Alabama Law Review 381; J Fisch, “Start Making Sense: an Analysis and Proposal
for Insider Trading Regulation” (1991) 26 Georgia Law Review 179.
8 Stephen M Bainbridge, “Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud” (1999) 52 Southern Methodist University Law Review 1589, 1621.
9 Chiarella v United States (1980) 445 US 222; Dirks v SEC (1983) 463 US 646.
10 For a review of these arguments, see Jesse Fried, “Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider
Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure” (1998) Southern California Law Review 71, 303–392.
11 I Ayres and S Choi, “Internalizing Insider Trading” (2001) Yale Law School Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 04. 
from the legislation, and a prosecution policy designed to filter out inappropriate
cases from its extraordinarily wide ambit. At present, the Australian insider trad-
ing provisions are under review by the Companies and Markets Advisory
Committee.12 However, the Committee’s initial Discussion Paper presently gives
no sign that Australian law will forego its present reliance on information connec-
tion tests. 
A novel issue to examine in this context is the application of the law on insider
trading to persons functioning as the external administrators (EAs) of insolvent
companies, such as trustees in bankruptcy, liquidators, receivers, and administra-
tors.13 EAs may often come into possession of information that is unknown to the
market, for example, information regarding the effect of the insolvency regime,
their own intentions, and other matters concerning other market participants.
There are two possible uses of such information. They may use that information
to trade on their private account. Such a trade would fall into the proscribed cat-
egory of insider trading in virtually every system—whether as misappropriation,
as trading by a primary insider, or as trading on information that is not generally
available. On the other hand, the information could also be used in the context of
the disposal of marketable securities whose value is affected by the information,
which are owned by the insolvent corporation, as part of the administration of its
assets. Such a trade would be an instance of outsider (versus “classical” insider)
trading, analogous to a business corporation that buys securities based on inform-
ation generated in the course of its own business. It is this latter situation that we
are interested in.
How important is this issue? One way to appreciate it is from the perspective of
recent work done in comparative corporate governance scholarship. The basic
insight of both the legal and financial economic literatures here is that there are
substantial differences in the industrial organisation of corporations of different
national economies. One of the hallmark distinctions between the governance of
corporations in English speaking jurisdictions from those in other developed
economies is the relatively limited corporate ownership of stock by other corpora-
tions. This is a contrast to the situation in such economies as Germany and Japan,
which have been characterised by a range of inter-corporate holdings through
such means as the stock pyramid and the keiretsu. Although less so now than five
to ten years ago, commentators urged corporations to adopt some of these fea-
tures—often described as “relational investing”. Clearly, the extent of relational
investment determines the scope of concerns associated with informed trading by
EAs—the larger these holdings, the more the need to pay attention to the subject.
In one sense, trades of this sort by the EA fall almost entirely through the cracks
at every possible point. In the context of the US approach, the EA would not be
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12 Companies and Markets Advisory Committee, Insider Trading, Discussion Paper (2001).
13 This is an area of little, if any, research: see, for example RC Pozen and JK Mencher, “Chinese
Walls for Creditors’ Committees” (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 747.
in the position of misappropriating information, since the information comes into
his hands for the purpose of dealing with an insolvent firm and will (ex hypothesi) 
be used for those purposes. In the context of the person connection approach, a
proscription would rarely arise since the EA ex hypothesi trades on the corporation’s
account, on the basis of its information. However, an approach which prohibits
trading on information that is not generally available would arguably prohibit such
a trade—unless there is some available form of defence or exculpation. The
Australian legislation is silent on the subject. There is, however, a very brief 
provision in the Corporations Regulations, inserted not long after the legislation was
introduced in 1991.14 It exempts certain EAs from liability for insider trading.
That provision is curious. On the one hand, it is strikingly incomplete—it includes
liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy, but not receivers or voluntary administra-
tors. On the other hand, it is strangely unqualified—it provides a generic exemp-
tion for those persons of a sort that is uniquely wide, consequently raising inclusion
concerns.
How should these matters be regulated? Is the absence of these trades from the
regulatory radar in the United States and most other jurisdictions, and the carte
blanche dispensation for liquidators in Australia, a reflection of the fact that there
really are no issues worth responding to in these cases? We may view this from sev-
eral perspectives. Let us first consider three arguments familiar from the insider
trading literature. The first is based on the proposition that the law should permit
traders to take advantage of information advantages that are capable of being
replicated or eroded by other traders.15 If one ascribes to this proposition, as so
many legal systems do,16 at least some of the forms of insider trading by an EA
ought to be impermissible. An example is where the knowledge relates to actions
that the EA intends to take which would impose costs on some other party, such
as a decision that would disadvantage unsecured creditors. That information is
often difficult or impossible to replicate by research.
Secondly, consider the view that permissions or exemptions for some forms of
trading on private information preserve incentives to produce new information,
which will in time be impounded into the price of securities.17 If that is true, it is
difficult to think that there are any forms of information that the EA would not, in
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14 Corporations Regulations 1990 reg. 7.11.01(1).
15 See, V Brudney, “Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws” (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review 322, 354. 
16 See Ayres and Choi, above n (making the claim that prohibiting the use of an unerodable informa-
tional advantage explains the US system) and the Corporations Act 2001 (Aust) s 1002B(2), (3) (mak-
ing exceptions for information deduced or inferred from what is in the public domain). In the UK
the Financial services and Markets Act 2000 was set to protect the integrity of the UK’s financial
markets by creating a new regime to tackle market abuse. This regime compliments existing laws
dealing with misconduct in financial markets. The central part of the regime is contained in the
Code of Market Conduct (FSA Handbook 2004).
17 See generally AT Kronman, “Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts” (1978)
7 Journal of Legal Studies 1.
any event, produce in the absence of a permission or exemption. This information
is generated in the course of the administration of the insolvent firm, so the mar-
ginal gain to the total stock of information is minimal or zero.
Thirdly, many of the defences of insider trading, beginning with Henry
Manne’s historic analysis,18 have used an argument to the effect that insider trad-
ing is ex ante in the best interests of shareholders as a whole. The characteristic
argument in this context is that insider trading helps to improve managerial incen-
tives in light of managerial risk aversion and the problems associated with writing
an optimal compensation contract. It is obvious, however, that this argument 
can cut but little ice in the context of trading by the EA. Where the liquidator of a
company, XYZ, trades in the securities of JKL on private information known to
her, one is immediately struck by the externality concerns that Ayres and Choi
evaluate—the trade will make uninformed shareholders in JKL worse off, to the
extent the liquidator earns an abnormal return, with few or no compensating
benefits of other forms for them. Moreover, the gains (the informational rents) do
not even accrue to other shareholders, but rather to creditors of the insolvent firm.
We may adopt the heuristic method of Ayres and Choi to ask whether under zero
transaction cost assumptions, the shareholders of XYZ would successfully engage
the shareholders of JKL in a Coasean trade under which the former shareholders
paid for the right for a liquidator appointed to the firm to trade on private inform-
ation. Although the shareholders of XYZ might willingly pay something for this
right—based on the fact that it may lower the cost of capital19—it is hard to say
that they will always (or, indeed, ever) value this right higher than the shareholders
of JKL. So, we might provisionally conclude that the economic case for allowing
informed trading by an EA seems to be quite weak.
The implication of this analysis is not that economics requires us to proscribe
informed trading by an EA, but to recognise that the existing arguments in 
relation to insider trading do not exhaust all of the factors relevant to trading by out-
siders, especially in the context of EAs. In this paper, we proceed by demonstrating
a series of cases which reveals the effects arising in these situations. When gener-
alised, they suggest four basic points.
First, permitting informed trading by insiders may reflect the difficulty of asso-
ciating a trade with the private information. Given that insolvency is frequently
associated with the realisation of assets, it will frequently be the case that the trad-
ing strategies of the EA will look identical, whether or not the EA was in posses-
sion of that information. Some legal systems provide defences where insider
information is deemed not to change trading behaviour or enable parties to adopt
trading strategies that are unaffected by later insider information, however, in the
UK according to the FSMA s 118(10) the types of behaviour which come within
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18 Henry G Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966).
19 The right would lower the cost of capital because it would allow the insolvent estate to earn abnor-
mal returns, rather than market returns.
the scope of the market abuse regime also includes inaction. These are crucial in
the context of insolvency where the information relates to the actions of an exter-
nal administrator, since expeditious realisation may be at least desirable and in
some cases mandatory. To prohibit insider trading in these circumstances would
be tantamount to imposing a mandatory rule that the EA would be required to dis-
pose of securities in a manner least favourable for the insolvent estate, inconsist-
ently with the general law applying to the EA or a contractual duty. A rule
permitting informed trades is most consistent with the duties and accountabilities
of the EA to creditors.
Secondly, various commentators have pointed out the fact that insider trading
regimes never include in their ambit the use of private information to reach a deci-
sion not to trade or to postpone trading.20 When we recognise this point, the case
for exempting trades by EAs from a prohibition is especially strong. This is
because the relative importance of the postponed trade is even greater to the EA
since there is only one other plausible trade for an EA—a trade brought forward.
When combined with the difficulty of associating trades with information, the
inherent importance of the permitted but postponed trade argues for an exemp-
tion for trades brought forward if the system is not to be capricious. 
Thirdly, the EA’s reputational capital will frequently deter an EA from trading
in a way that is regarded as inappropriate by market participants. In general,
insider trading can be hard to detect, but the EA’s trades will usually be easy to
identify in retrospect. In these circumstances, the market for EAs will sanction the
EA by devaluing the EA’s reputational capital where the EA has overreached,
acted negligently, or, in some other respect, acted inconsistently with the interests
of creditors. Rational EAs will therefore choose not to engage in these behav-
iours.21 These reputational incentives are supplemented, consistently, by the gen-
eral law or contractual duties the EA owes in relation to the discharge of his duty.
This article is organised into four substantive parts. Section B discusses the
anatomy of informed trading by insiders. It is important to understand not only
the circumstances where insider trading is an issue, but also something of the spec-
trum of cases which may possibly arise. Section C then provides an overview of
some of the legal issues that may arise in these cases. The treatment is intended to
be non-specific to any single jurisdiction, but instead has regard to the key incid-
ents of the three genera of insider trading laws we have referred to above. Section
D examines some of the principal policy issues which arise in these cases. We 
consider first the implications arising from the application of the factors reviewed
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20 For example, Reinier Kraakman, “The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United
States”, in Klaus J Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch (eds), European Insider Dealing (London, Butterworths,
1991) 48; Henry Manne, “Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information” (1985) 4 The
Cato Journal. 933, 938. Cf. Jesse M Fried, “Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading
through Pretrading Disclosure” (1998) 71 Southern Caifornia Law Review 337–340.
21 It is, however, true that the value of an EA’s reputational capital is not perfectly consistent with
social welfare, since the value of the reputational capital will mostly be set by lenders and bond-
holders, rather than shareholders.
in the general insider trading literature and then move on to explore a series of fac-
tors more specific to EA cases. In this section, we address the implications of our
analysis for a variety of hypothetical examples introduced illustratively in Section
B. Finally, in Section E we consider whether more specific regulation is needed 
in this area, examining the implications of more tailored provisions relating to
trading and of more specific disclosure obligations. The article is concluded in
Section F.
B. THE ANATOMY OF INFORMED TRADING BY EXTERNAL
ADMINISTRATORS
1. Introduction
This section develops a more specific understanding of what is involved and the
issues that arise in situations that involve informed trading by external adminis-
trators. Apart from the introductory comments in this section, we introduce a tax-
onomy of cases designed to allow the reader to understand the variations in cases
that might arise in these areas, and introduce a series of illustrative hypotheticals.
These hypotheticals are reused in Section D, after we analyse informed trading by
insiders.
To begin, we must first appreciate that informed trading by an EA only
becomes an issue where the insolvent firm owns securities, and in particular traded
securities. If the firm owns securities that are not traded, the EA will usually need
to sell these by private contract of some form with a buyer that will occur dehors any
exchange. In that context, it may be required to give warranties or undertakings
regarding certain facts or situations relevant to the value of the securities. The pur-
chaser may demand and be granted the opportunity to investigate and undertake
due diligence into the circumstances of the company in which the securities are
sold.22 The common law itself may oblige certain special facts to be disclosed by
the vendor.23
Where however the securities are exchange-traded, then there may be scope for
asymmetrically informed trading by the EA. Why would a firm own exchange-
traded securities? As has been argued in detail in the finance literature, there is no
particularly good reason for the firm to own these securities, since its own share-
holders can replicate that security holding in their own portfolio should it be valu-
able.24 That is not to say that firms will not hold such securities. Risk-averse
managers, rationally undiversified, may value the potential diversification effects.
In addition, the securities may be held for reasons other than their risk-return
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22 Jordan v Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1987).
23 See, eg, Strong v Repide, 213 US 419 (1909); Glavanics v Brunninghausen (1996) 19 ACSR 204; on appeal
(1999) 32 ACSR 294.
24 RA Brealey and SC Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, (New York, McGraw Hill, 7th ed, 2002).
properties. One important reason is that the investment supports some form of
business relation with the other corporation, which relation might be motivated
either by efficiency reasons or monopoly.25 Investments in firms may also be a part
of a series of commitments that each firm gives to the other. The existence of that
sort of relation also makes possible the potential for the insiders in that firm
(including the EA) to possess information relevant to the value of those securities,
and, therefore, the scope for informed trading.
The potential existence of private information may derive from a range of
sources. Several possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that the administration
of the insolvency may itself change the valuation of certain firms, some of which
the insolvent firm may hold securities in. Secondly, the EA must undertake a
process of valuing the firm and its investments. In doing so, new information will
be generated that may be relevant to the value of other securities. Thirdly, the con-
duct of the external administration such as the proof of debts or the investigation
of possible causes of action may reveal new information about other traded firms.
In the next section, we see how these different sources of information can be 
harnessed to permit the development of a taxonomy of cases. 
2. A Taxonomy of Cases 
The taxonomy developed in this section has two dimensions. The first dimension
involves the process by which the EA came into the possession of the information.
The second dimension refers to the relation between the source of information
and the ownership of the securities involved in the informed trade, specifically
whether or not the information was generated in connection with the insolvency
in which the trade takes place.
To examine the first dimension, we may distinguish three different processes by
which the EA comes into possession of the information. First, the information can
be endogenous to the insolvency—in other words, the information itself is about
the economic effects of the insolvency. Secondly, the information may be gener-
ated by the EA in the course of the insolvency and the discharge of the adminis-
trator’s duties. Thirdly, the information may simply have a coincidental
connection with the insolvency, as where the EA is informed of some matter by
another party in the course of performing the duties of the administration. The
distinction between the two latter categories is not precise.
To examine the second dimension, we may distinguish between whether or not
the information was generated in connection with the insolvent estate whose
securities are the subject of the informed trade. On the one hand, the information
may arise in the course of administering insolvent company A, and be used to
trade securities owned by company A. Alternatively, the information may be used
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increase vertical or horizontal efficiencies and hence market power.
to trade securities owned by company B, for which the EA also acts. Obviously,
these issues resonate with concerns about conflicts of interest. We may describe
these as intra-insolvency and inter-insolvency trades.
If we cross these two dimensions, we can identify six different possible scen-
arios involving some form of informed trading by the EA. These are set out in
Table 1.
Table I: Taxonomy of Informed Trades occurring in Insolvent Firms
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information Intra-insolvency trades on Inter-insolvency trades on
endogenous information endogenous information
Generated information Intra-insolvency trades on Inter-insolvency trades on
generated information generated information
Coincidental information Intra-insolvency trades on Inter-insolvency trades on
coincidental information coincidental information
It would also be possible to identify a third dimension—whether or not the EA
traded on that information or whether he tipped or procured another trader using
the information. This situation, however, involves similar issues to those arising in
cases of inter-insolvency trades. Section C examines each of these trade types in
more detail and uses illustrations to clarify the issues they raise.
3. Illustrating the Taxonomy
(a) Intra-insolvency trades on endogenous information
In this situation, the private information in question arises from the conduct of the
insolvency, and its economic effects on other firms. Prominent examples might
include decisions to be taken by the EA to realise assets, to refuse to accept a proof
of debt, or to commence litigation in order to pursue a right to damages. Such
information is necessarily generated during the course of the insolvency, and, to
the extent of any divergence from market expectations, the EA will always have
first access to it. Scenarios 1 and 2 illustrate what is involved in the case of intra-
insolvency trades on endogenous information.
Scenario 1: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit on behalf
of C against company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C
holds stock in D. 
In Scenario 1, the information relates to the fact of the suit and the costs and
expected damages award it will occasion. The market may have expectations
about the likelihood of a suit against D; however, unless the expectation is that 
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the suit has a probability of either zero or unity, a decision to continue a suit (or to
discontinue a suit) will always constitute new information.
Scenario 2: R, a receiver of company C, appointed by bank B under a floating
charge, has been made a private offer by a purchaser P, who is willing to buy the
business undertaking of C. The next-best alternative to selling the business to P is
to run the business for a further twelve months, to complete the development of a
product. C’s only other asset, besides the business, is a holding of (listed) securities
in company D (currently worth $2 million). C undertook a number of business pro-
jects with D, and owes D a large unsecured debt. B is currently owed $10 million,
and that debt bears interest at the rate of 10% pa. C has unsecured debts of $20
million, half of which is the debt to D. Apart from the $10 million debt owed by
C, D has other assets valued at $15 million. P has offered $8 million for the busi-
ness. If R chooses to run the business for a further 12 months, there are two equally
likely outcomes—the business will be worth $8 million or $31 million. The
information about that valuation is generally available. R is instructed by B to sell
the undertaking and not to develop the company business. 
In Scenario 2, the private information is the fact that the disposition of the assets
of the business that is optimal for B has altered from the going concern develop-
ment to the sale; and the impact this will have on payoffs to D and to other unse-
cured creditors. The other party who has this information, or some part of it, is P,
since he knows what offer he is making, and may be able to deduce its effect, if it
is accepted, on the other creditors. What P may not know is the likelihood that R
will accept that offer, since P may not know the value of the next best alternative,
and thus the effect on creditors such as D. As with scenario 1, possession of that
information lies with R and is endogenous to the conduct of the insolvency.
(b) Intra-insolvency trades on generated information
In discharging his or her duties, an EA is required, amongst other things, to deter-
mine the value of realisable assets and the magnitude of claims against them. In
doing this, the EA may generate private information relevant to tradable secur-
ities. The key difference between this and the first case is that the EA is less likely
to have a monopoly on that information than in the case of endogenous informa-
tion, although how likely the EA is to have restricted access to that information
depends on the extent to which the insolvent corporation has control over another
corporation, to which that information relates. On the other hand, the more con-
trol the firm has over the subject of the information, the more likely it is to be
pulled into the insolvency and out of the actively traded firms on the market.
Scenario 3 is an example of such information:
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Scenario 3: V, the voluntary administrator of company C, has decided to sell off C’s
30% equity interest in S, a related company. It is the largest shareholder in S. V
has material, private information related to the financial prospects of S. 
In this situation, the information has been generated in the course of the EA. The
EA’s access to it may also be shared by other parties, such as S’s directors, con-
trollers, and other substantial shareholders. It may be the case that these other par-
ties came into possession of the information sooner than the EA does. One effect
of more widely disseminated private information is that there is a greater likeli-
hood that share prices already reflect the value implications of that information.
(c) Intra-insolvency trades on coincidental information
During the course of the administration, information may fall into the hands of the
EA that the EA does not incur any marginal costs to acquire or produce. The activ-
ity that uncovers the information may be costly (eg, investigating the magnitude of
the firm’s debts), but it is not undertaken with the purpose of generating informa-
tion.26 The information is simply acquired coincidentally. It is the marginal cost of
acquisition or production that is the distinction between this and the last categor-
ies and there are a large number of contexts in which such information may
emerge. For example, they may emerge from the interactions between the EA and
the officers. A liquidator may be required to file a report into the circumstances of
the insolvency, and will need to speak to the officers as part of that process. Other
information may emerge in the course of the process by which debts are proved in
the insolvency. To illustrate these examples consider Scenario 4 and 5:
Scenario 4: V, the administrator of company C, is told by D, one of C’s former
directors, that he, D, is under investigation for fraudulent behaviour in relation to a
number of transactions in C’s securities that were illegal under market manipula-
tion provisions. D is the CEO of another company, E; C has securities in E. If D
is convicted, he is likely to be incapable of further participating in the management
of E. V is uncertain when the decision to prosecute will be publicly announced and
is considering selling the securities in E?
Scenario 5: L, the liquidator of company C, receives a proof of debt by a Norwegian
company, N, alleging that C has used internet software that violates intellectual
property rights belonging to N. C owns securities in company E, which also used the
same internet software. D is considering selling securities in E before the informa-
tion relating to the patent infringement suit becomes generally available?
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In Scenario 4, the private information relates to the effect on E of any prosecution
of D. In Scenario 5, the private information relates to the effect on E of the possi-
ble patent infringement. Since the EA is in both cases a recipient rather than the gen-
erator of the information, the EA is unlikely to have any monopoly over the
information. The trading implications of it are likely to be uncertain, unless the EA
incurs costs to investigate more attentively. Moreover, the EA may acquire the
information rather later in time than other possessors of that information. 
(d) Inter-insolvency trades 
Since we have already examined the three types of information which an EA
might trade on, it is not necessary to distinguish them again in this context. The
hallmark of inter-insolvency trades is that they are based on information emanat-
ing from an insolvency other than the one in which the information is used for
trade. The scope for such trades is obvious by virtue of the fact that many insol-
vent corporations will have relatively limited securities holdings, so that the
information generated in, or coincidental or endogenous to the insolvency, cannot
be used in relation to that security. Given, however, that the EA is likely to have
an involvement with other insolvencies at the same time, there may therefore be
other opportunities to use that information in other contexts. These are suggestive
of misappropriation theory possibilities. We may develop a sixth scenario, which
is based on an adaptation of scenario 1 involving endogenous information. 
Scenario 6: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit on behalf
of C against company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C
does not hold stock in D, but company E, of which L is also the liquidator does hold
stock in D. L trades E’s stock before information regarding the suit of C against D
is publicly available.
Similar adaptations are possible with the other earlier examples. In some of
these cases, the trade would not be thought to impose harm on the company the
insolvency of which caused the information to be generated. But there are clear
exceptions, in those situations where there is actual moral hazard. The first relates
to information about a firm’s insolvency before it is publicly known. Scenario 7 is
an illustration involving a company that seeks advice in relation to a reconstruc-
tion before its insolvency problems are publicly known. The concern is that insider
trading may cause that information to come to light, doing harm to the company
seeking the advice.
Scenario 7: L is a registered liquidator and offers advice in relation to financial
reconstructions. Company C seeks advice in relation to financial reconstruction.
Company D, which holds securities in company C, commences winding up and L
is appointed the administrator. L would like to sell D’s securities in C.
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The other example of a classic conflict of interest is where the EA engages in
some form of “front running” on behalf of an insolvent corporation in precedence
to the corporation whose insolvency gave rise to the information. Hence, we may
vary the sixth scenario as in Scenario 8 to illustrate this.
Scenario 8: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit on behalf
of C against company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C
holds stock in D, as does company E, of which L is also the liquidator. L trades
E’s stock first, and then D’s stock next, before information regarding the suit of C
against D is publicly available.
In the next section we revisit what is described above as a potential third dimen-
sion of informed trades by EAs—the communication of information to others, or
the procuring of trades by them. This is closely related to inter-insolvency trades,
because of the severing of the “proprietary” connection between the persons 
on whose behalf the trade is undertaken and the firm whose insolvency was the
context for the origination of the information.
(e) Procuring and Communication
The practice of tipping is a very frequent issue arising in the context of insider trad-
ing. It arises in part because of the inability (either because of transaction costs or
because a person’s trades are especially closely monitored) of a single person to
exploit all of the trading opportunities associated with private information, and
may also arise in a context of repeat dealings in which information is exchanged
in the expectation of other benefits.
The persons most likely to be tipped in relation to the information are the cred-
itors of the insolvent corporation. In the United States, for example, this issue is
particularly acute in the context of insider trading by members of creditors’ com-
mittees in insolvent firms. That is obviously a particular issue where the creditors
are financial institutions, likely to have a wide range of equity investments under
management. In the Anglo-Australian context, where a receiver is appointed under
contract by a secured creditor, there is a particular concern associated with the
relay of information by the receiver to the secured creditor. Scenario 9 illustrates.
Scenario 9: R, a receiver of company C, appointed by bank B under a floating
charge, has come into possession of private information gleaned from the conduct of
the receivership regarding the securities of company D. C does not own securities in
D, but B owns put options on D’s shares. May R communicate that information to
the officers of B prior to that information becoming generally available?
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C. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF INFORMED TRADING BY
EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATORS
1. Introduction
In Section A of this article we examined the different approaches to insider trad-
ing liability that are employed internationally. The purpose of this section is to
examine, in light of these different legal regimes, what issues are likely to arise in
the context of the forms of insider trading that we identified in Section B. Although
our focus is primarily on insider trading liability per se, there are other legal issues,
such as fiduciary duties, in some of these cases. We should note that our focus is
intended to be a general examination of issues, rather than at a more detailed doc-
trinal analysis of each.
2. Intra-insolvency trades on endogenous information
The only incidence of a proscription of trading in these cases would seem to arise
under third-generation, Australian-style prohibitions on informed trading. Here
the exemption for liquidators excuses the trade in Scenario 1, but there is no sim-
ilar exemption for receivers in Scenario 2. The American and English
approaches would not seem to proscribe the trade. In the case of the American
system, there is simply no misappropriation. The information is not being used
deceptively or in breach of any confidence or fiduciary duty. On the contrary, it
is being used in the context it originates, presumably for the best interests of the
residual claimants (now, the creditors) of the firm. In using the information to
realise the value of assets for the highest value, the EA is likely to be acting in a
manner that is consistent with the EA’s fiduciary duty, or at least consistently
with his contractual obligations in cases of receivership. Similar comments apply
to the English system, since by trading on information relating to the company
on the company’s account, the EA simply does not trigger any of the definitions
of it as an “insider”. These results would seem to apply equally to both Scenarios
1 and 2.
3. Intra-insolvency trades on generated information
The situation in relation to information that the EA generates in the course of con-
ducting the administration would be expected to stand in a similar category to
intra-insolvency trades on endogenous information. The information is generated
in the course of the administration, so the application of the misappropriation
theory would be expected to give practically identical conclusions in relation to
this matter. Likewise, the results for the second and third generation of statutory
insider trading laws would also not be expected to apply differently. 
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The reader may recall that Scenario 3, illustrating this category of information,
involved information that related to a corporation in which the insolvent firm had
a controlling interest. Such cases are particularly likely to arise in the context of
intra-insolvency trades on generated information, since the insolvent firm is more
likely to have prior access to this information than other people in the market.
Consistent with this possibility, attempting to trade those securities without reveal-
ing private information may not actually be possible.
4. Intra-insolvency trades on coincidental information
The possibility that a legal prohibition applies to intra-insolvency trades on coin-
cidental information is somewhat greater than for the two categories above. In the
first two situations, the information in question was generated by the EA or within
the context of the external administration. In this third situation, by contrast, the
EA will usually receive the information from another person directly, or based
upon an interaction with that other person. The question that then arises is
whether or not trading on that information would be inconsistent with the pur-
poses for which the information was communicated. Put in a slightly different
way, are there any limits on the EA’s property rights in the information that has
been provided to him? In particular, are there some uses of that information
which are permitted or are there some which are not? Clearly, in the context of
the misappropriation theory, the determination of the possible uses of a certain
piece of information will determine the nature of the EA’s fiduciary duty.
To apply this to Scenarios 4 and 5, is there any possible basis for distinguish-
ing the two cases? On the one hand, the information in relation to a proof of
debt has to be made known to the EA—it goes to a fundamental part of the
insolvency for debts to be advised to the EA. On the other hand, information
learnt more coincidentally ranks in a different situation. In Scenario 5, for exam-
ple, the information relating to the offences committed by the director may be
thought to have an important connection to an EA’s responsibility as an officer
of the court to investigate potential offences committed by directors of the firm.
The difference may be that information learnt when acting as an officer of the
court may be regarded as relevantly different to information learnt as part of the
mainstream administration. The former information is imparted only for relay to
the regulatory authorities; the latter is not. Australian law is relevant in this
respect since it provides that communication of insider information is itself an
offence, although it excuses communications which occur in circumstances
where the person receiving the information was not expected to trade on it or to
procure others to do so.
A clearer situation might arise in a context where a former director relayed
information concerning a corporation that had nothing to do with any offence he
or she had committed—that the EA had no real reason to know or discover.
Particularly where the director acquired that information in the context of service
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on another board, any communication to the EA would arguably be tainted as
being in breach of a fiduciary duty or duty regarding confidential information.
Any attempt by the EA to use that information would presumably be treated in
the same way. Thus, the key legal issue would be thought to focus not on the EA
but on the source and the context of the private information.
5. Inter-insolvency trades 
In Section B, we argued that some inter-insolvency trades could prejudice the
interests of the firm that generated the information, whereas others would not be
expected to do so directly. However, the need to prove an element of loss has never
been regarded as necessary for a breach of fiduciary duty. All that is necessary is
some action which is motivated by interests other than those which the fiduciary
is obliged to protect. It would seem reasonably straightforward that an inter-
insolvency trade, such as those in Scenarios 6 and 7, would be actionable under
the misappropriation theory. Indeed, in the case of an inter-insolvency trade, there
would arguably be, in some cases, a double misappropriation—a breach of duty
in relation to both the original source of the information, and a breach in relation
to the insolvent company in the administration of the insolvency of which that
information was learnt. 
In much the same way, it would seem likely that inter-insolvency trades would
constitute prohibited actions by a primary insider, at least in relation to endogen-
ous and generated information, and possibly also as a secondary insider in the case
of the more adventitiously acquired forms of coincidental information. 
In this regard, however, the Australian approach to insider trading in inter-
insolvency trades by liquidators would appear to be protected by the exemption
provision for liquidators. That is not to say that this provision would constitute a
total dispensation of liability. There is still scope for liability for breach of fiduciary
duty, as well as the scope for liability under statutory provisions applicable to
officers (which includes external administrators) which reinforce general law
duties in the context of the “improper” use of information acquired by virtue of
the officers’ position.27 In situations such as Scenarios 7 and 8, where there may
be actual damage inflicted, some form of action for damages or equitable com-
pensation would seem to also be open.
6. Procuring and Communication
The likelihood of some form of prohibition is very high in the context of the
procuring and communication offences. Liability is common here, for both the
tipper or for the tippee. In the United States, insiders are liable for disclosing
inside information to recipients where the disclosure breaches a fiduciary or like
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duty owed by the tipper either to the company whose securities are traded or to
the owner of the inside information.28 The United Kingdom approach is similar.
Communication of insider information by primary and secondary insiders is pro-
hibited unless it takes place in the proper performance of the communicator’s
employment or office.29 As with Australian law, there is also a defence where the
person to whom the information is communicated is not expected to trade on
that information, or that any trade would not result in any profit.30 There may
be overlapping remedies in this context as well, such as an action for breach of
confidence.
7. Syntheses
What is apparent is that there are important variations between the three differ-
ent generations of legal regimes in how they respond to these different types of
trades. In order to capture these differences, we redraw Table I for each of the
principal regimes. It is observed that the US and UK models (Tables II and III)
produce roughly similar results, in terms of the trades proscribed. That is, inter-
insolvency trades are seen to be unlawful in both systems whereas intra-insolvency
trades are not (except for those involving coincidental information). By contrast,
the Australian system (Table IV) reaches very different results, which are strikingly
invariant with respect to trade type.
Table II: Treatment of Informed Trades under the US Model
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information No liability Misappropriation
Generated information No liability Misappropriation
Coincidental information Potential misappropriation Misappropriation
liability if used in breach of 
confidence or duty
Table III: Treatment of Informed Trades under the UK Model
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information No liability Liability as a primary insider
Generated information No liability Liability as a primary insider
Coincidental information Potential liability as a secondary Liability as a primary and
insider secondary insider
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Table IV: Treatment of Informed Trades under the Australian Model
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information No liability for liquidator, No liability for liquidator, TIB.
TIB. Receiver, VA liable Receiver, VA liable
Generated information No liability for liquidator, No liability for liquidator, TIB.
TIB. Receiver, VA liable Receiver, VA liable
Coincidental information No liability for liquidator, TIB. No liability for liquidator, TIB. 
Receiver, VA liable Receiver, VA liable
The question that arises, which we examine in the following section, is which of
these patterns of results is most consistent with the results that would be reached
by the a priori application of economic analysis to each of the categories of insider
trading.
D. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFORMED TRADING BY
EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATORS
In this section, we review some of the main policy arguments put in relation to
insider trading, and which have been proposed as justifying particular balances
between permission and prohibition. We conclude in general that these have little
to offer in permitting or prohibiting insider trading. We then review other argu-
ments more particular to insider trading by EAs. Finally, we review our taxonomy
of cases and how these arguments might be brought to bear on the case-types.
1. Principal Policy Arguments in Insider Trading 
In this section, we consider three important policy arguments in relation to insider
trading. The first relates to the theory that the law imposes a prohibition where a
trade is based on an informational advantage that is not susceptible of being
eroded by other traders, and a permission where that advantage is in some sense
replicable. The second, which is related to the first, theorises that the law on
insider trading optimises, or at least should optimise, the incentive to create new
information, and to bring this information to the market. The third, which is more
a group of arguments than a single argument, are those that permit certain forms
of insider trading and prohibits others in the interests of the equityholders of the
firm. We consider each of these seriatim.
(a) Erodability
One of the principal policy arguments that defines an agenda for insider trading reg-
ulation is the claim that it is unfair for parties to trade on “unerodable” informational
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advantages, especially those which might arise from a person’s position in a firm
or other privileges connected to that firm. This theory holds that such advantages
cannot be matched or overcome by even the most diligent analysts. The argument
is best put as a claim in relation to fairness or equity because using those advan-
tages is unfair to those who do not have those advantages. It is often a short step
from that claim to the argument that permitting trading on such advantages would
diminish the confidence of investors who do not have informational advantages to
enter and trade in the market. One of the most persuasive recasting of such a
theory in economic terms is Nick Georgakopoulos’s use of the theory of market
microstructure to analyse the effect on bid/ask spreads and liquidity of monopolies
on information, and its use for “strategic” informed trading.31 Georgakopoulos
shows that investors trade less often (depriving the market of liquidity) where they
perceive that an insider, or a group of insiders acting in concert, can trade strate-
gically on insider information.
The theory of erodability is vulnerable to various criticisms. Ian Ayres and
Stephen Choi point out there is little or no reason to believe that trading on an
erodable advantage necessarily increases social welfare, because of the risk of
either excessive investment or underinvestment in search costs. Likewise, trading
on an unerodable advantage might increase social welfare, to the extent that it
leads to efficiency gains in more accurate share prices. Ayres and Choi’s claim is
that these possibilities require a contractible approach to informed trading law
which essentially endows the firm with the power to decide whether informed out-
sider or informed insider trading should be permitted.
What light does the erodability of an informational advantage shed on insider
trading by the EA? In truth, very little. First, in relation to intra-insolvency trades
on endogenous information we find that the case for a prohibition is here perhaps
at its strongest, since the EA has access to such endogenous information solely by
virtue of his office. The EA will monopolise this information until his decisions
become publicly announced. Thus, in theory, the case for prohibiting a trade on
this information should be quite strong. Yet as we have seen such trades are the
most likely to survive legal challenges.
Secondly, in relation to intra-insolvency trades on generated information, the
application of the erodability theory depends in part on the information itself. As
noted above, the situation where the information relates to the value of a share-
holding in a company over which the company has control is one where the infor-
mational advantage is likely to be unerodable. In general, the informational
advantage would be expected to depend on how much control the insolvent firm
has over the company whose securities the EA trades. 
Thirdly, in relation to intra-insolvency trades on coincidental information, the
informational advantage is inherently likely to be more widely available than
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endogenous or generated information. That is particularly true in a case like
Scenario 5, where information about the overlapping intellectual property rights
are both in the public domain. On the other hand, where the information is passed
on by another person with an unerodable informational advantage, as is true in
Scenario 4, one might expect in some cases a prohibition to apply to any trade on
the information by the EA, analogously to a tippee.
How do these results change in inter-insolvency trades? One would expect that
the results do not change, since the informational advantage remains substantially
as it was before. Prohibitions would persist for endogenous information, generated
information in relation to controlled companies, and information derived from
tippers with access to insider information. On this analysis, then, erodability is
incapable of explaining the varied legal results that we observed in Section C. To
see this in tabular form, observe Table V, and compare it to Tables II to IV above.
We can see it does not explain any of the patterns in any of the systems.
Table V: How Erodability Should Explain a Pattern of Regulation32
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information Strong case Strong case
Generated information Z Z
Coincidental information Weak case Weak case
(b) Creation of New Information 
Related to the theory of erodable information advantages is the claim that pro-
viding scope for informed trading encourages the creation of new information,
which, when disclosed or traded on, adds to the accuracy of stock prices. This
theory is consistent with the misappropriation theory, to the extent that it recog-
nises some degree of property rights (in the sense of excludability) associated with
the creation of new information.
However, this premise is unlikely to provide much scope for permitting insider
trading in cases involving EAs. A great deal of the information that we have seen
will be inframarginal to any law regulating informed trading. In other words, that
information will be created or acquired anyway, as a by-product of the EA itself.
Certainly, that is true of endogenous information and much coincidental infor-
mation. But it is less than wholly clear that the inframarginality of these forms of
information is actually a ground for prohibiting trade. Since the marginal social
cost of production is zero, the case for permitting trade depends on the balance
between the other benefits associated with permitting trade (such as increased
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accuracy of stock prices, or decreasing the agency costs associated with the
appointment of an EA) and any attendant social costs.33
Generated information stands in a slightly different category to endogenous and
coincidental information. The EA incurs costs to generate information in order to
determine the most expeditious form of realisation, and to set decision rules in
relation to the trades that should or should not be made. Thus, to allow the EA to
trade on such information preserves the incentive to create such information.
Generating this information ought to make the residual claimants of the insolvent
firm (the creditors) better off, to the extent that the cost of generating this infor-
mation is presumably less than the private benefit arising from the returns from
beneficial realisations of the securities. However, that is not the dispositive inquiry
from an efficiency perspective, because the private benefit to the residual
claimants of the insolvent firm will be exactly offset by the uninformed traders in
the securities the EA has traded. The question, rather, turns on the comparison
between the cost of producing this information, and the social benefits from its
production. This, too, is not very clear at the abstract level. So the strength of the
case for permitting trades on generated information is theoretically no clearer than
it is for permitting trades on endogenous information.
As with the question of informational advantage erodability, it is by no means
clear that the information-production incentive effect of the law provides any
insight into this area, either. It provides relatively little insight, also, into the dis-
tinction between intra- and inter-insolvency trades. Arguably, it provides a
justification for inter-insolvency trades to the extent that a prohibition of these
trades preclude an EA from preferring the creditors of insolvencies other than the
one in the context of which the information is generated.34 However, that argu-
ment does not seem persuasive, since the purpose of such a prohibition could just
as easily be served by a “front-running”-type ban on trading the securities of other
insolvent firms ahead of those owned by the corporation in whose insolvency the
information was generated. In addition, permitting inter-insolvency trades
responds to a problem that the incentive for an EA to use any information depends
on the EA holding the appropriate securities that can be traded (in effect, sold)—
the scope for trading between insolvencies actually allows the incentive effect to
operate. In other words, a law that is intended to motivate information production
cannot have any effect unless securities exist and inter-insolvency trades effectively
expand that pool. An argument could thus be made for allowing inter-insolvency
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decisions of the firm in order to create profitable trading opportunities (for example, by increasing
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34 For example, the liquidator of firm A who generated private information about the securities of
company Z would be required to trade the securities of firm A before those of B, C, D, . . . N. That
would preserve priority for the creditors who “subsidise” the production of this information.
trades to the extent that each firm would be willing to subsidise the production of
information to the extent it would increase the chance of gainful trades on any
securities it holds, rather than just those that possessed private information.35 So,
Table VI again shows a pattern that is not consistent with any of Tables II to IV.
Table VI: How Information Production Should Explain a 
Pattern of Regulation
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information Ambiguous case (inframarginal) Ambiguous case (inframarginal)
Generated information Moderate case Moderate case
Coincidental information Ambiguous case (inframarginal) Ambiguous case (inframarginal)
(c) The Interests of Shareholders 
Much of the economic analysis of insider trading, beginning with Henry Manne’s
famous analysis,36 has developed various arguments why insider trading might
actually be in the best interests of the shareholders of the corporation.37 This
would enable a permission of insider trading to be justified as a hypothetical bar-
gain, consistently with the dominant normative heuristic used in corporate law.
On the other hand, there are contrary arguments and below we consider several
of these issues for their relevance to trades by EAs. Some of the most discussed
issues (such as the effect of informed trading by managers on management incen-
tives in an incomplete contracting environment38) are not relevant, because they
are premised on a trade by an insider, not just an informed trade.
As a preliminary matter, we may note that an “interests of the shareholders”
argument used in the context of informed trading by EAs is immediately compli-
cated by two things. First, which shareholders are we referring to? The share-
holders of the firm in whose securities the EA trades, or the shareholders (or their
successors as residual claims, the creditors) of the now-insolvent firm? This is the
key question associated with any outsider trading situation, as Ayres and Choi
recognise. In general, the former group of shareholders is likely to internalise a
wider range of the costs and benefits of informed trading. However, as we shall see
in this context, these arguments tend to divide between contexts. The first argu-
ment relates to the interests in the traded firm, but the following ones relate to
interests in the insolvent firm. 
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(d) Stock-price accuracy
One of the principal arguments for insider trading is that it has the effect of increas-
ing the price efficiency of the capital market. This occurs when market analysts trans-
late the signal lying behind buy and sell orders from insiders. The extent of the
stock-price effect from insider trading depends in large part upon how many parties
have the information and how liquid the market in the stock is. These factors deter-
mine the extent to which the insider or insiders can trade smaller parcels of the stock
more frequently in a strategic manner designed to extract the maximum rent from
the private information.39 Accuracy is generally in the interests of shareholders,
because of the value of stock prices as a means of determining the quality of man-
agement, and in order to make better consumption, saving and investment decisions. 
Stock-price accuracy is unlikely to offer much persuasive justification for per-
mitting informed trading by EAs. The reasons are relatively simple. First, if the EA
turns up “good news”, there are likely to be no trades he can engage in on the basis
of that information. He is a seller, not a buyer. His best response will therefore be
to do nothing until the information becomes public. Those actions are unlikely to
contribute anything to price efficiency. Secondly, if the EA turns up “bad news”,
the extent of the stock price reaction to any trade he undertakes is likely to depend
on the size of the parcel he has to trade. So, trading by the EA is likely to speed up
price falls and perhaps retard price rises. It is thus unclear on the directional 
relationships and we have not drawn a Table for this heading because it is not
obvious how this argument differs at all for any of the trade types.
(e) Delaying Disclosures
By contrast to the first argument regarding stock-price efficiency, a counter-
argument directed against insider trading is that it encourages managers to defer
disclosures which would move the share price in order to give them an opportun-
ity to trade first.40 This argument has some relevance to the external administra-
tion context, but only where the EA is under some form of obligation to make
disclosures. The principal instances where this may be a problem is in a case like
Scenario 1 and 2, related to endogenous information, which the EA will disclose
publicly at some future point. By contrast, the EA would not seem to have any
generic obligations to disclose publicly most of the generated information relevant
to asset values (although a mandatory disclosure obligation is possible in some sit-
uations), or his coincidental information. So there is a possible case for prohibiting
trades on endogenous information. By contrast, this argument may have its most
telling criticism against inter-insolvency trades, since the scope for delay is proba-
bly greatest in those situations where more than one trade is contemplated. This
is reflected in Table VII:
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Table VII: How Disclosure Delay Should Explain a Pattern of Regulation
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information Strong case V Strongest case
Generated information Moderate case V Strong case
Coincidental information Weakest case V Weak case
( f ) Changing Investments
It has been argued that one of the reasons why one might want to prohibit insider
trading is its effect on the insiders who decide investment policy of the firm.41 For
example, the insider might specifically chase risks whether or not these risks added
value to the firm in order to create both upside and downside opportunities for
trade. This point may initially seem to have little application to the EA. We would
need to identify a situation where the EA deals with the assets in such a way that
it created a profitable insider trading opportunity in spite of its effect on the assets.
However, since we are examining a situation where the EA is trading on his own
account, that does not appear to be a particular concern. The EA is an outsider
trading the securities of firms whose assets he does not control, which limits most
of the situations where this might occur.
The only way in which this might occur is if the EA takes decisions in the admin-
istration that cause the value of other companies to fall, as for example in the sit-
uation with insider trading on endogenous information. Scenario 2 is an example.
However, in these situations, the EA is simply trading in advance of a loss that
would otherwise be sustained by the estate. Moreover, as will be recalled, in
Scenario 2, the decision to sell the assets increased the welfare of the secured cred-
itors; it did not decrease the value of the assets themselves. The EA will never
choose to decrease the value of the assets in order to generate private information
to trade on, since the effect on the value of the assets will always exceed the effect
on the value of the securities of other firms.42 This is unlike the paradigm insider
trading situation where the insider does not internalise the full social costs of the
changed production-investment opportunities.
(g ) Conclusion
To conclude, the principal economic arguments that have been arrayed for and
against insider trading, or for and against particular distinctions between what is
October  Journal of Corporate Law Studies 445
40 K Scott, “Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy” (1980) 9 Journal of Legal
Studies 801 at 817–18.
41 R Haft, “The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation”
(1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 1051.
42 This is because no firm ever internalises more than 100% of the effect on the other firm, and often
internalises only a very small fraction.
permissible and what is prohibited, seem to offer few clear conclusions. Similarly,
they seem to explain very little of the current operation of the prohibitions on
insider trading, observed internationally, applied to the situation of interest to us.
It is therefore appropriate to move on to consider a series of arguments that
respond more specifically to the practical circumstances in which informed trad-
ing by an EA is likely to arise.
2. Arguments Specific to the EA Context
In the last section, we examined how the context of trading on private information
by the EA can undercut or render irrelevant the normative thrust of any particu-
lar policy argument for the permission or prohibition of insider trading. In this 
section, we review these points in more detail. We find in this context a more
specific set of justifications for exempting informed trading by EAs. In the follow-
ing section 3, we examine these arguments in the context of the Scenarios intro-
duced in section B.
(a) Identifying Insider Trading 
The first operational consideration relates to the difficulty of distinguishing trad-
ing that is based on private information from trading where that information is not
influenced by the possession of information. As we have seen, the principal respon-
sibility of an EA usually involves the sale of assets. This is the case in each of the
principal approaches to insolvency and in a formal liquidation the EA has a duty
to take possession of the company’s assets and realise them. A slightly different
dynamic arises in a reconstruction of some form, whether of the Chapter 11 vari-
ety in the United States, or of the administration procedures in Anglo-Australian
law. Prior to the creditor’s meeting where the proposed re-arrangement is voted
on, it is not the external administrator’s job to liquidate the assets of the company.
However, the administrator does have the power to sell assets and it would not be
unusual or surprising if he or she decided to sell assets, such as marketable secur-
ities in other companies, that are not required for the conduct of the business
should there be a decision made to reorganise the business. The final insolvency
situation is the “privatised” variety best known to Anglo-Australian law in which
a receiver is appointed under a floating charge. The receiver’s duty in this case is
to deal with the assets in a manner that enables the creditor to maximise the value
of his or her security in order to discharge the underlying debt. That usually
involves the sale of assets, either on a going concern or piecemeal basis. Should it
be more profitable to attempt to reorganise or turn the business around those steps
would usually be undertaken prior to the adoption of the more extreme
“endgame” step of appointing a receiver.43
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Because the sale of assets is either the dominant responsibility or a legitimate
power of the EA, the EA will not, and cannot be expected to, follow a “hold” strat-
egy in relation to marketable securities even in the intermediate term. In other
words, they must sell relatively soon after appointment. If the EA will sell at some
time, it may be very difficult to tell whether the timing of that decision was moti-
vated by information or whether it was reached by independent reasoning. It may
not be difficult to lay a “paper trail” in order to demonstrate that the decision was
reached before the information came into its possession. If a plaintiff or a prose-
cutor finds it difficult to identify which of these trades is proscribed, and which is
not, the costs associated with the high incidence of Type I errors (permitting
informed trading) and Type II errors (prohibited uninformed trading) will justify
a more general permission of trading. This provides some justification for the carte
blanche exemption provided in Australian law, but does not explain why one
would differentiate between a liquidator versus a receiver or administrator.
(b) The Scope for Insider Trading Liability
The second point also derives from the fact that the only trade an EA will enter
will be a sale of an existing holding of securities. The other possible trades—short
sales and purchases—are most unlikely to be observed by an EA acting intra vires.
It follows therefore that where the EA possesses insider information, the EA can
only use it:
(a) by deciding to sell (where the information is “bad”, suggesting the securities
are overpriced) or by deciding not to sell (where the information is “good”,
suggesting the securities are underpriced); and
(b) in relation to the securities of other companies owned by the company
under administration, since the market in that company’s own securities is
likely to have come to an end.
These considerations suggest that the scope for insider trading is limited and non-
systemic. To impose liability for trading by the EA would often be capricious. This
is because a decision not to sell, or to postpone a sale (in the advent of good news)
is not prohibited by the legislation, whereas a decision to sell in anticipation of bad
news would be prohibited. As we can see from condition (a), decisions not to sell
or to postpone selling will be expected to constitute approximately half of the cases
where the EA is able to make use of private information (purchases and short sales
being impossible).44 This is unlike the situation that prevails for other traders
where a decision to purchase securities, buy call options, or sell put options, on the
revelation of good news will always dominate in the sense they produce a higher
payoff than a decision to postpone a sale. In these situations, it makes sense not to
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proscribe postponement. That logic, however, does not apply to EAs. Moreover,
if we compare the two forms where the EA can make use of insider information,
the decision to sell may contribute to market efficiency to the extent that the size of
the trade permits an effect on price, whereas a decision not to sell cannot of course
have that effect. 
This argument has been made in other parts of the literature—that decisions not
to trade, based on private information, are not proscribed, even though they may
well constitute a dominant use of private information.45 That argument has been
criticised by Jesse Fried.46 Fried argues that decisions not to trade are qualitatively
different from decisions to trade. Where there is a decision not to trade, the insider
simply earns the market return on the equity, like uninformed traders taken as a
whole, even though he avoids a loss. By contrast, where there is a decision to trade,
the insider earns a positive abnormal return, at the expense of uninformed traders.
Thus, there is a cost to uninformed trade that is not paralleled in the situation of
informed non-trade. 
Although a cogent argument, it needs to be qualified for the EA context: namely
that the law encourages EAs to realise assets, rather than encouraging them not to
realise them. Thus, to proscribe realisation based on private information, but to
permit holding strategies similarly based, is inconsistent with the essential nature
of an EA’s role. This is unlike non-insolvency contexts, where there is no reason to
be indifferent between realisation and holding.
Once more, these considerations seem to support an approach which provides
a generalised exemption, at least for intra-insolvency trades, but which does not
discriminate between liquidations and other forms of administration.
(c) Reputational and market effects
The market incentives applying to the EA discourage socially undesirable forms of
insider trading. It would be preferable to leave the regulation of these trades to
these market incentives. On one hand, the EA internalises little or any of the out-
come from the trade. Any informational rents flow to creditors. This outcome
immediately attenuates the EA’s incentive to trade. On the other hand, the EA has
an incentive to maintain a reputation for demonstrating professional ethics.
Although insider trading may be difficult to detect in general, trades by the EA will
be relatively easy to detect because the EA is obliged to keep books and records,
which may be examined by contributories and creditors.47 The market will be able
to infer, ex post, those trades which were based on private information. The EA
therefore has an incentive to engage only in those trades which do not negatively
affect his reputation. Because the EA’s reputation ought to be consonant with
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social welfare, the market incentives are likely to be sufficiently effective that reg-
ulation is unnecessary.
The extent to which we can rely on the EA’s reputation as a self-enforcing
device in this area is reinforced by the EA’s general law duties. Those duties
encourage the EA to use private information consistently with the best interests of
the creditors, rather than based on the interests of other parties, or the EA’s own
interests, or in some other manner involving overreaching. These legal duties
restrict any residual incentive of the EA to act in a manner that reputational 
considerations might be thought to discourage, because of the magnitude of a one-
off gain.
This factor provides the strongest explanation for the shape of the US-UK bias
against inter-insolvency trades, and perhaps also against the use of coincidental
information in intra-insolvency trades.
Table VII: How Reputation Should Explain a Pattern of Regulation
Intra-insolvency Trades Inter-insolvency Trades
Endogenous information Weak case V Strong case
Generated information Weak case V Strong case
Coincidental information Moderate case V Strongest case
In the following Section 3, we consider these issues in the context of the more
specifically defined scenarios of insider trading by an EA that would, in the
absence of an exemption, be prohibited by the insider trading provisions. We find,
in general on closer examination, that the case for excluding EAs from the terms
of the legislation are reinforced.
3. Analysis of Insider Trading by External Administrators
(a) Intra-insolvency trades on endogenous information
Scenario 1: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit against
company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C holds stock in
D. L must decide the time at which to sell securities in D before announcing pub-
licly that he will sue D?
In this case, the private information is that L will bring a suit on behalf of C against
D. As we have seen, in Australian law, although prima facie prohibited, the trade
would not be prohibited by the insider trading laws in the UK and the US and
would be permitted by the general exemption.
The clue which helps to reveal the appropriateness of this resolution is to
acknowledge that it is L’s fiduciary duty to maximise the value of the estate of com-
pany C, on behalf of its creditors. In this case, then, we may suggest that the
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fiduciary duty is consistent with the non-negative effect of this trade on the repu-
tational capital of the liquidator. That duty applies to his or her decisions both to
litigate and to realise the value of the securities in D. Let us assume that the deci-
sion occurs in the context of a three-period model. At t0, L decides whether or not
to litigate, based on an expectation that C will succeed in recovering damages, A,
with probability p. At t0, the market valuation of D is V, and C owns some per-
centage, g, of D. At t1, L commences litigation, which is publicly observable by the
market. At t2, the litigation is resolved, and L either recovers A or nothing. For 
convenience, we have assumed away litigation costs. Figure 1 demonstrates the
payoffs to C in each period (from both the sale and the lawsuit), should the sale
occur in that period:
It is clear that the value of C is maximised by selling at t0, given the reduction in
the value of D, after the litigation is announced. We would argue that it is not
“unfair” for L to take this course of action.48 It is arguable that the optimum would
be for L to sell the securities before he decided whether or not to commence the lit-
igation in order that the value of the shares do not affect L’s decision. However,
there is no practical difference in outcome between selling before the decision is
made, and selling before the decision becomes public knowledge. In both cases,
the liquidator sells at the then extant market price, and expects to receive pA. It fol-
lows that there should be no difference in legal treatment. That result also suggests
that market efficiency may not be substantially affected by selling prior to the
announcement. Information related to the possibility of a suit would often be
known to parties associated with D, so the market price may already reflect the
likelihood of the suit. We have seen some of the arguments against this proposi-
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Fig. 1. Payoffs to the Company
tion, too. The information advantage is unerodable, which suggests the trade
should be prohibited, but on the other hand, there is a possible argument for moti-
vating the production of this information (although endogenous information is
inframarginal) as we saw. So these two points tend to cancel each other out. 
This conclusion is reinforced if we move away from the simplified three period
model to a world of continuous time, in which litigation occurs over a lengthy
period. If L is to be prohibited from selling before the litigation commences, then
the same prohibition would seem to require that L also not sell after the litigation
commences because of the fact that L will have information that cannot, in the
interests of the litigation, be made generally available. It follows that L could not
sell until the litigation was actually concluded, which would delay the liquidation
considerably.
If this analysis is correct, does it apply equally to administrators and receivers?
There is no obvious reason why it would not apply to administrators. Arguably,
this scenario is less likely to apply to administrators prior to a vote on whether or
not the company should enter a deed of company arrangement, but if the credi-
tors vote to do so, the administrator’s position would seem to be the same as the
liquidators.
In general, the only possible difference between liquidators and receivers is the
more “privatised” qualities of external administration in the case of a receiver
appointed under a charge.49 The receiver, when appointed under a charge, is not
an officer of the court, unlike the liquidator. Hence, is there any basis for relying
on this distinction to differentiate the results? We would argue not. That distinc-
tion does not affect any of the efficiency analyses we saw above. Nor is there any
basis for saying that what would be fair for a liquidator would be unfair for a
receiver, except in terms of the fact that the receiver tends to secure gains for a sin-
gle secured creditor, rather than (typically) a number of unsecured creditors. This
does not seem to be relevant to insider trading liability. The absence of such a basis
for distinction is also generally applicable to our conclusions in relation to the fol-
lowing hypothetical. We now turn to our second intra-insolvency trade involving
endogenous information. 
Scenario 2: R, a receiver of company C, appointed by bank B under a floating
charge, has been made a private offer by a purchaser P, who is willing to buy the
business undertaking of C. The next-best alternative to selling the business to P is
to run the business for a further twelve months, to complete the development of a
product. C’s only other asset, besides the business, is a holding of (listed) securities
in company D (currently worth $2 million). C undertook a number of business pro-
jects with D, and owes D a large unsecured debt. B is currently owed $10 million,
and that debt bears interest at the rate of 10% pa. C has unsecured debts of $20
million, half of which is the debt to D. Apart from the $10 million debt owed by
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C, D has other assets valued at $15 million. P has offered $8 million for the busi-
ness. If R chooses to run the business for a further 12 months, there are two equally
likely outcomes—the business will be worth $8 million or $31 million. The infor-
mation about that valuation is generally available. R is instructed by B to sell the
business and not to develop the company business. Should R sell the securities in D
before it advises publicly that it has accepted P’s offer?
Scenario 2 features similar elements to Scenario 1. Both situations involve the EA
having to decide whether or not to realise an asset before taking an action that will
adversely affect those securities. In both cases, the property rights and fiduciary
duty approaches tend to militate in favour of permitting the trade.
To model this problem we will again use a three period model. At t0, R decides
whether or not to sell the shares, and whether or not to accept P’s offer. At t1, R
has decided at t0 to accept P’s offer, but has made that information public before
selling the securities in D. We reach t2 in circumstances where R has announced
it will not accept P’s offer, so that it sells the business at the end of 12 months, with
the equal chances of receiving $8 million or $31 million. Figure 2 demonstrates the
payoffs to B, D, and the other creditors, should the sale occur in that period.
Figures quoted are in millions for the sake of convenience.
These figures require explanation. Should R accept P’s offer and sell the shares in
D at t0, B will break even. The total realisation is $10 million, which is equal to the
outstanding debt. D receives nothing on the $10 million face value of its debt. In
order to understand the situation at t1, it is necessary to understand the valuation
of D’s shares. In the absence of information regarding P’s offer, the market values
D’s equity on the basis of its rational expectations regarding the value of D’s loan
to C. The face value of the debt is $10 million. However, at present (ie, prior to
knowing about P’s offer), there is only a 50% chance that the debt will be repaid
(where the business is worth $31 million), and a 50% chance that D will not be
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Fig. 2. Payoffs to Bank B and Company D
repaid at all. Therefore, the market value of that debt should only be $5 million.
It follows that the value of D will therefore be $20 million, being that $5 million
debt and the other assets worth $15 million. A $20 million valuation implies that
B must own 10% of the equity, since its shares are worth $2 million. However,
once R announces it will accept P’s offer, the debt is worth nothing because there
will be no money for unsecured creditors. D is then worth $15 million, and the
value of C’s holding in D will fall by $500,000. 
If P’s offer was rejected, and the business was developed, there are two possible
scenarios. Where the business could be sold for $8,000,000 (the same amount as
P’s offer), B will be $1 million worse off than it was at t1, representing the interest
on the debt (the total payoff is therefore a loss of $1,500,000).50 Where the busi-
ness is sold for $31 million, all creditors recover their debts in full. It should be
apparent that B’s preferences are not perfectly aligned with social welfare. Wealth
is maximised where P’s offer is rejected, since the expected value of the business in
twelve months is $19,500,000, which is higher than $8 million at t0. However, B’s
expected payoff from accepting P’s offer is a payoff of either $10,000,000 in t0.
$9,500,000 in t1, compared to an expected payoff of $9,250,000 in twelve months
(the mean of $10,000,000 and $8,500,000). So, in the absence of a side deal
between B and D (and the other unsecured creditors), R will accept P’s offer.
Although this is suboptimal, it is important to note that it is clearly not the role of
the insider trading provisions to discourage such decisions from being made.
Once again, the case in favour of permitting R to trade is strong. It maximises
recovery for B for R to trade in t0. Although on the facts of this case the unsecured
creditors were no better off for the trade occurring in t0, it is clear that had P
offered more than $8 million, it would have been in the interests of the unsecured
creditors for R, were it of a mind to accept P’s offer, to trade in t0, not in t1.51 R
used the information in B’s best interests.
This is a useful example of two points made in the general analysis. First, had P
made an offer that would have increased the value of the shares in D—as any offer
over $20 million would do—R was better off using that private information to
abstain from trading in t0 and to trade after that information was made generally
available. This use of the insider information would be perfectly lawful. It there-
fore illustrates the caprice associated with not permitting R to trade where the
information is bad rather than good. 
Secondly, had P not made the offer, R would have sold the stock at t0 anyway.
It was in R’s interests to liquidate that position expeditiously. Therefore, the pri-
vate information did not change the decision to sell the stock.
It remains a question of fact whether R would in fact be able to trade 10% of
the stock in R without moving the price downward, driving the market towards a
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more accurate valuation of the stock. The above analysis assumed unrealistically
that the price would be unchanged. The more the trade moves the price towards
its “true” price, the more efficient is the market in the stock of D. Thus, on bal-
ance, Scenario 2 is essentially the same as Scenario 1. It justifies the same general
permissive treatment. 
(b) Intra-insolvency trades on generated information 
Scenario 3: V, the voluntary administrator of company C, has decided to sell off C’s
30% equity interest in S, a related company. It is the largest shareholder in S. V
has material, private information related to the financial prospects of S. Is V per-
mitted to sell off S, and what are V’s obligations in selling off S?
We have suggested that the answer to this problem may often lie with a specific
mandatory disclosure obligation where the securities are sold, rather than via
means of insider trading prohibitions. A disclosure obligations in relation to the
sale offer is likely to be imposed by law where the offeror has control of the cor-
poration.52 However, these are likely to cut in only where there is some form of
controlling relation between the insolvent firm and the company in which the
securities are traded. A fiduciary duty in equity is also imposed in some situations
involving the reverse hypotheticals—where the informed party buys the securities
of another shareholder. However, in the situation we are examining here, where
only sales are contemplated, and the buyer is unlikely to be owed any fiduciary
duty, there is little in the way of case-law in Anglo-Australian law to suggest a duty
arises at common law. 
The appropriateness of such a solution can be seen by reference to several of the
above arguments. Where there is a large secondary offering of securities, a disclo-
sure obligation as a condition precedent is crucial for efficient capital allocation.
That seems a reasonable premise, and may even occur in the absence of a formal
obligation because of the negative signalling value in the absence of certification. 
By contrast where the EA has generated information in relation to securities of
a corporation over which he or she has little or no control, the case for an insider
trading obligation seems unnecessary. The dominant bases for this proposition are
twofold. First and perhaps most importantly, the generation of information in rela-
tion to assets to be disposed of is to be expected—such behaviour maintains or
increases the value of the EA’s reputational capital. Secondly, the EA (especially a
liquidator) must often still sell in the relatively short term whether the news indi-
cates the stock is undervalued or overvalued. If the stock is undervalued, a longer
term holding strategy is rarely possible, except in a reconstruction. So, the gener-
ation of this information has in fact a relatively low net present value because of
the absence of a means of capitalising on good news.
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(c) Intra-insolvency trades on coincidental information 
Scenario 4: V, the administrator of company C, is told by D, one of C’s former
directors, that he, D, is under investigation for fraudulent behaviour by ASIC in
relation to a number of transactions in C’s securities that were illegal under the mar-
ket manipulation provisions in ss 997 and 998. D is the CEO of another company,
E; C has securities in E. If D is convicted, he is likely to barred from management
under s 206B and would be incapable of managing E. V is uncertain when ASIC
will disclose its decision to prosecute. Should V sell the securities in E?
To begin, let us consider whether D would have any right to trade in the stock of
E based on his knowledge that he would likely be barred from its management.
The answer to that question would seem clearly to be no. This is one of those cases
where it is undesirable to recognise D as having any property rights in such infor-
mation warranting protection, in light of his own wrongdoing.53 It would be
inconsistent with his fiduciary duty. 
If D is prohibited from trading, does it follow that V also should be? This case
is less clear. Unlike D, V does not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of D.
Although the information came from a fiduciary, it was important in relation to
the affairs of C and would arguably have come by other means into the possession
of V or any subsequent liquidator of C. The case for saying that the law should not
recognise any informational rights in C which R could exploit by trading is there-
fore weaker. However, D’s own fiduciary obligations to E may make it arguable
that the information communicated to others should be subject to restrictions in
their hands as well, to reinforce the fact that the information is not communicated
for trading purposes. So, a fiduciary argument does tend to suggest a possible case
for prohibition.
However, other points are not quite so clear. Associating the trade with the
information, because of the high likelihood that these securities would be sold in
any event. In addition, if used for trading, at least half of the coincidental infor-
mation will not be proscribed to the extent that it is used to defer sales that would
otherwise occur. Finally, it is unclear what the impact of such a trade on reputa-
tional capital is actually likely to be. In this particular situation, it is not clear
whether information conveyed to an EA as an officer of the court, used in the best
interests of the estate is, or is not, likely to harm the EA’s reputational capital. That
is an empirical question. Thus, this issue is unclear, so the divergence between the
US and UK systems on one hand, and the Australian, on the other, is less trou-
blesome than elsewhere.
It is easier to resolve Scenario 5 where the information is not derived from the
classic insiders of a corporation, but rather from information concerning the busi-
ness itself.
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Scenario 5: L, the liquidator of company C, receives a proof of debt by a Norwegian
company, N, alleging that C has used internet software that violates intellectual
property rights belonging to N. L also acts as the liquidator of company D which
owns securities in company E, which also used the same internet software. Should
L sell D’s securities in E before the information relating to the patent infringement
suit becomes generally available?
There are several points of specific distinction. First, there are no fiduciary confu-
sions in this case, as there were in the last case, and the information N is provid-
ing is not confidential. Secondly, the information is not being conveyed to L in any
circumstances that could be regarded as an officer of the court. L learns of it in the
context of the liquidation, so its use for that purpose is hardly surprising. Thirdly,
the information itself is, arguably, more susceptible to competitive trading than the
information regarding the prosecution of D and its effect on E, since it does not
have its origins in the behaviour of company insiders. On the contrary, much of it
may be in the public domain. Registered intellectual property rights could be
inspected, any non-registered rights (such as copyright) could be scrutinised by
examining the original copyright work. The information might also be discerned
by examining any parallel litigation commenced by N in relation to the protection
of N’s rights. 
We may also note generally, before we move on to consider inter-insolvency
trades, that if an EA sells its securities, it in fact obviates any future conflict of inter-
est, insofar as one arises from ownership of securities in E. It will then make deci-
sions relating to assisting the prosecuting authorities in relation to share
transactions free of those interests. The case in Scenario 5 is slightly more com-
plex, but the case against the trade is no stronger. It is arguable that by holding,
rather than selling, the securities in E, L’s incentives to resist the claim made by N
in relation to C may be stronger. This is because of the positive correlation
between the value of the holding in E, and the expected value of the proof of debt
by N. However, there is no reason why that incentive needs to be stronger, and the
creditors of C are unlikely to desire it. Holding the securities in E simply increases
the company’s exposure to N, and the market is unlikely to reward the bearing of
that security-specific risk.
(d) Inter-insolvency trades 
We have seen that the US and UK systems are likely to associate a greater level of
legal proscription with inter-insolvency trades because of the “primary insider”
classification or the “misappropriation” result, whereas the generalised exemption
protects liquidators and trustees in Australia. Let us now examine to what extent
these trades can be analysed in terms of the factors we have considered above. 
In terms of the general policy arguments related to insider trading, the “erod-
ability” of the information advantage remains substantially as it was in relation to
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the analysis of inter-insolvency trades. So there is no real change in this context.
What about the creation of new information? This point is again somewhat
ambiguous in relation to the incentive effects of inter-insolvency trades. On the
one hand, there is a free-rider concern—one group of creditors end up free-riding
on the costs incurred by another. In this situation; a ban on insider trading func-
tions as a sort of mandatory rule allowing for excludability in relation to the “pub-
lic good” quality of the private information. On the other hand, permitting
inter-insolvency trades allows for a wider range of securities to benefit from private
information. A useful heuristic is to inquire into examine this question in terms of
the Coasean bargain the shareholders and creditors of corporations might reach
in relation to the use for trading on such information. The concern is that a rule
permitting inter-insolvency trades may systematically favour some corporations
that hold a larger portfolio of securities, but not others. It is unclear what bargain
if any would be reached in this situation.
What about the factors we studied in connection with the interests of the share-
holders? Again, these factors point in multiple directions. The accuracy of stock
prices presumably increases from the wider scope for trading; moreover, there is a
clearer signal if a liquidator sequences two or more trades at the same time. What
of the possibility of delay in trading? Inter-insolvency trades may arguably delay
the making of disclosures to the markets where there is a larger number of hold-
ings to be traded together. Finally, it is difficult to see how inter-insolvency trades
can have any effect on changing investments, as was also true of intra-insolvency
trades. 
We now turn to examine the factors more specific to trades by EAs. These fac-
tors point less equivocally towards the case for a prohibition on insolvent trading.
First, it does remain difficult to identify an inter-insolvency trade as being
specifically informed. However, two comments can be made in this context. One
is that a pattern of trades would tend to point towards evidence of inter-insolvency
trades. The other is that there may be some more obvious linkages between trades
and private information, the less connected the company owning the securities
and the company in whose insolvency the information was generated. An exam-
ple would be an abrupt sale of securities in a slow-moving insolvency contem-
poraneously with some other event in another insolvency.
Secondly, we saw above in the context of intra-insolvency trades that the scope
for informed trading is highly limited, both because only sales can attract supra-
normal returns and because of the likely absence of securities to beneficially trade
in this context. That attenuated scope weakens the case for imposing liability.
However, because the scope for inter-insolvency trade is likely to be greater than
in intra-insolvency trades, that argument becomes somewhat more ambiguous.
Thirdly, the reputational capital point, reinforced by fiduciary duties represents
the strongest argument against inter-insolvency trades. The possibilities for over-
reaching, such as preferring other principals to the one engaging the EA, delaying
decisions or disclosures to complete trades, and so on, all represent areas which
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would be expected to affect negatively the value of the EA’s reputational capital.
This is consistent with the fiduciary prohibitions on conflicts of interest and secret
profits to which EAs are subject.
Thus, on balance, the case for prohibiting inter-insolvency trades is quite
strong—it is clearly stronger than the case in relation to intra-insolvency trades.
This tends to confirm the approach of the less specific US and English systems to
these trades, and tends to be inconsistent with the approach of the generic exemp-
tion in the Australian system. We now briefly examine each of these scenarios in
turn. Scenario 6 and 8 are illustrative.
Scenario 6: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit on behalf
of C against company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C
does not hold stock in D, but company E, of which L is also the liquidator does hold
stock in D. L trades E’s stock before information regarding the suit of C against D
is publicly available.
Scenario 8: L, a liquidator of company C is considering initiating a suit on behalf
of C against company D alleging misleading and deceptive conduct. Company C
holds stock in D, as does company E, of which L is also the liquidator. L trades
E’s stock first, and then D’s stock next, before information regarding the suit of C
against D is publicly available.
Here, we can see the appeal of a prohibition because of the larger fiduciary con-
cern. This is more intense in Scenario 8 than Scenario 6, because of the more obvi-
ous conflict of interest in this particular situation, and the more obvious impact on
the reputational capital of the EA. Scenario 7 involves an even stronger conflict of
interest. The concern is that insider trading may cause that information to come
to light, doing harm to the company seeking the advice, not just reducing the
profits of one principal for the benefit of another.
Scenario 7: L is a registered liquidator and offers advice in relation to financial
reconstructions. Company C seeks advice in relation to financial reconstruction.
Company D, which holds securities in company C, commences winding up and L
is appointed the administrator. Can L sell D’s securities in C?
At least part of the information—the decision of C’s management to seek the
advice of L, and any information they impart to L—is both private and confiden-
tial. If market participants decode the information content of L’s trades, C could
be substantial injured. The appropriate, ethical course of conduct, above and
beyond insider trading issues, is for L to disclose its conflicts of interest to C—the
fact that it is acting for D, which owns stock in C, and for transactions in that stock
to proceed with the consent of L. We would argue that in the absence of explicit
and well-informed consent (unlikely to be given), L’s transaction should be 
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contrary to law. Difficult questions of proof remain. It continues to be difficult to
determine whether L is, or is not, selling on the basis of the insider information or
has determined to sell the securities prior to the information coming into his pos-
session.
(e) Procuring and Communication
The concerns associated with the EA procuring or tipping trades are clear and
they make for an obvious case for proscription. Fiduciary and reputational capital
concerns make this clear, and tipping vastly opens up the scope for wider insider
trading—buy transactions become possible. There is also a clear risk of expropri-
ating information that is contrary to the incentives to create new information.
Thus we have Scenario 9:
Scenario 9: R, a receiver of company C, appointed by bank B under a floating
charge, has come into possession of private information gleaned from the conduct of
the receivership regarding the securities of company D. C does not own securities in
D, but B owns put options on D’s shares. May R communicate that information to
the officers of B prior to that information becoming generally available?
Scenario 9 involves a clash between two legitimate aims. On the one hand, it is
necessary for there to be uninhibited communication flows between R and C. C
appoints R to represent its interests, and it is appropriate for C to be able to dis-
cuss matters arising in the receivership in order to maximise the welfare of R. On
the other hand, it may be undesirable for C to trade on that information. Scenario
9 is an example which is poised somewhere in the middle ground. The fact the
information concerns another company suggests that the possibility of strategic
trading is relatively low. However, other scenarios could be developed in which
trading by others could be much more problematic. One situation is where the
information concerns securities, particularly debt securities, in an externally
administered firm in which there is a surviving market in the firm’s securities or
the securities of a firm within, say, the corporate group. Trading on that informa-
tion could be highly problematic because of the likelihood of non-competitive
trading on that information close to the time of its revelation. In the United States,
this is an acknowledged problem in creditors’ committees in the reorganisation of
insolvent firms under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.54 Clearly, it is not a
problem for the EA who will only be concerned with the sale of the firm’s assets,
not with trading in the firm’s securities. However, the concerns in connection with
the creditors feed back into the appropriate policy to be applied to the communi-
cation of information. It is reasonably clear that the exemptions for liquidators in
Australian law do not apply to the communication of information to creditors
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(since the provision speaks of “transactions entered”), and of course those provi-
sions do not apply to receivers or administrators.55
It would seem that the appropriate course of action lies in the existence of satis-
factory Chinese Walls within the creditor-appointor. Chinese Walls are necessary
to ensure that there is a divorce between the person to whom information is com-
municated concerning the insolvency (eg, the officer responsible for the loan) and
the person who may make decisions regarding trade in the securities.56
( f ) Conclusion
The purpose of this section has been to illustrate the need for the law to take a rel-
atively complex and contingent approach to the regulation of informed trading by
EAs. We have seen that many of the policy arguments that have been proposed in
the economic analysis of trading by classical insiders have limited weight in this
context. However, there are a distinct set of policy arguments which explain why
some forms of informed trading, such as intra-insolvency trades, especially on
endogenous and generated information, are not usefully prohibited, whereas 
others, such as inter-insolvency trades should be unlawful. This set of results is,
surprisingly, most likely to be consistent with the outcomes of applying the US and
UK regimes, which have been formulated without explicit reference to informed
trading by EAs, as opposed to the sui generis exemption for trades by liquidators
which is used in the Australian regime. The contrast is interesting—it makes more
sense for the law to try to reinforce the results that analysis suggests that reputa-
tional capital would reach (such as permitting intra-insolvency trades, and pro-
hibiting inter-insolvency trades), rather than simply assuming that legal sanctions
have no place in the regulation of trades by liquidators.
In the next part, we consider some possible ways of devising an optimal regula-
tory process for informed trading by EAs. This attempt is based on the notion that
even though the US and UK methods do approximate the intuitively efficient
results, there may well be more sophisticated and appropriate regulatory responses
to this problem.
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However, it is by no means clear that it similarly exculpates an EA from the breach of s 1002G(3)
should he or she communicate information to the creditor’s representative. The problem lies in the
fact that s 1002G(3) states that the insider must not communicate information “to another person if
the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the other person would or would be likely to
(a) . . . purchase or sell . . . securities”. If the corporation for which the second works itself is to be
regarded as a person for the purposes of that section, it is not clear that the presence of a Chinese
Wall affects the application of the communication offence.
E. THE FORM OF INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS: THE WAY FORWARD
We saw in the above sections that the optimal regulatory method that should apply
to informed trading by EAs is unlikely to be greatly influenced by some of the long-
standing policy premises such as fairness, investor confidence, equal access, and
even the accuracy of market pricing. The other factors that are more relevant do
not lend themselves to simple solutions but vary depending on the context of the
trade and the information, and the second-order problems associated with the
application of the legal rule. That may be why more complex and contingent legal
regimes applicable to insider trading actually perform more creditably than the
one which provides a carte blanche exemption for informed trades by EAs. In this
section, we relax the method adopted above of comparing existing methods, and
examine some of the parameters that an optimal regulatory approach might actu-
ally take in this area.
1. Distinction Between Types of External Administrators
The analysis in this article has not supported the current division between the
transactions entered by liquidators (which are excluded from the scope of the
insider trading provisions by the regulations) and other EAs (to whom the provi-
sions apply with full force). A distinction in legal treatment is not appropriate. It is
possible that certain types of EAs, such as privately appointed receivers in English
law, are more likely to engage in the forms of informed trades more warranting
proscription (for example, procuring and communication, inter-insolvency
trades). However, that does not seem to be any basis for differentiating the appli-
cation of the laws. It simply suggests an empirical proposition that there will be
variation in the incidence of appropriately proscribed trades amongst different
categories of EAs. 
2. Proscribed Trades
The gist of our analysis in Section D was that inter-insolvency trades should be
prohibited. By contrast, there is a stronger case for permitting intra-insolvency
trades. In relation to those trades, we saw that some trades on coincidental inform-
ation (for example, Scenario 4) justify a prohibition because the trade is inconsis-
tent with the circumstances in which the information was acquired. The optimal
provision therefore has the following elements:
(a) it would impose a general prohibition on trades by EAs that are based on
private information, and also on the communication of information to other
persons unless those communications are protected by law;
(b) it would exclude from that prohibition those trades based on private 
information that was revealed to or generated by the EA in the course and
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context of the administration of the insolvent estate which includes the
securities the subject of the trade;
(c) the exemption in (b) is contingent on the use of the information not being
inconsistent with the obligations of confidentiality or secrecy assumed in
receiving or generating that information, or in undertaking the administra-
tion.
This enables us to differentiate Scenarios 4 and 5 without prohibiting trades on
endogenous or generated information. On the other hand, the provision does not
require the drawing of a hard and fast line between any of the information cat-
egories. This is desirable as the line between generated and coincidental informa-
tion may sometimes be highly imprecise.
3. Distinction Between Types of External Administrators
Is there a case for obliging the EA to disclose his or her trades? Disclosure may be
imposed at one of two different times. One is before the trade occurs—the EA
would signal his intention to sell a particular holding of securities. Jesse Fried has
advocated this as a model that might decrease the incentive to engage in insider
trading. The other is after the trade occurs—the EA reports the trades he or she
has engaged in, some defined period after the trade occurs. An analogous obliga-
tion exists under s 16 of the Securities Exchange Act. The timing of the obligation
would be expected to have an impact on the returns associated with the trade. 
A pre-trade disclosure obligation should naturally decrease the profits to
informed trade, but only where the market expects the insider to possess private
information. As we have seen, however, sales by EAs may often be uninformed liq-
uidity trades undertaken to realise the value of the firm’s assets. Can the market
tell the informed from the uninformed trades? As much as the market might
meaningfully evaluate is a probability that a trade is informed based on the likeli-
hood that a company’s securities will be affected by the insolvency or that the EA
will be in a position to generate information about the securities. So a pre-trade
disclosure would convey some information, but not all that much. 
We might also ask whether a pre-trade disclosure requirement is really needed
for informed trades by EAs. There is something to be said for the contrary view.
As Fried argues, the measure of returns by insiders is huge. That these losses are
sustained by uninformed traders makes it imperative to decrease the measure of
these returns in order to retain liquidity in the market. Although it is ultimately an
empirical question, the absence of constraints on unfettered trading by the EA on
private information suggests that the magnitude of returns from these trades is lim-
ited (so diminishing the case for such intervention).
By contrast, an ex post mandatory disclosure obligation may be of some value.
Consider an obligation to report one’s trades within three to five trading days after
the sale by the EA. To the extent that the EA is likely to be informed, it is desir-
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able to ensure that trading decisions are notified to the market expeditiously. This
assists the market to adjust to new information. In addition, it enables the market,
creditors, and other interested parties to monitor the behaviour of the EA and to
re-evaluate the measure of his reputational capital. It may also be appropriate to
impose two other forms of disclosure obligations. First, it is desirable to ensure that
any persons acting as EAs who do advisory work have obligations to disclose to the
advisory client any interests that the companies they administer hold in the client’s
stock. Such a disclosure obligation allows conflicts of interest of the sort that arise
in inter-insolvency cases to be monitored.
At the same time, the legislation should make it clear that EAs are responsible
for disclosing endogenous and generated information to the market on a timely
basis. That provision should oblige the EA to disclose to the market any informa-
tion of which the EA is aware that is:
(a) not generally available, 
(b) relates either to the effects or outcomes of the administration or the value of
assets owned by the administered firm;
(c) is likely to be relevant to the valuation of:
(i) any securities of the corporation, that continue to be traded, 
(ii) other exchange-traded securities.
That provision, combined with the intra-insolvency insider trading exemption,
would have the effect of bringing the relevant information to the market sooner. It
is desirable to have both the exemption for the informed intra-insolvency trades
and the disclosure obligation—without the exemption, the EA may want to evade
the obligation because of its effect on the estate; without the disclosure obligation,
the EA’s information may take excessively long to reach the market. It would be
appropriate to impose a maximum period of, say, a one-day trading period 
following a trade in which the information relating to those securities must be 
disclosed.
To conclude, we argue that the the appropriate responses to informed trades by
EAs involve prohibiting inter-insolvency trades and permitting intra-insolvency
trades, which are free of misappropriation-type elements. These principles ought
to be supported with an obligation to disclose trades, to disclose all relevant
conflicts of interest, and to disclose private information as it becomes available.
This represents a more practical set of responses to the nature of informed trading
by EAs.
F. AFTERWORD
On balance, these provisions provide a more rational basis for regulating insider
trading by EAs. The area is one in which the need for legal protection is limited,
compared with other areas of trading involving insiders. The law needs to respond
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to this problem by a provision that is capable of achieving the finer balances than
the current law which combines a flat prohibition with a blanket exemption for liq-
uidators. We have recommended a broad exemption for all classes of EA, coupled
with a disclosure obligation and an obligation to trade “all or nothing” of the 
corporation’s securities. This would be a significant advance in the law.
464 An Economic Analysis of Trading on Private Information  .   
